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FIRST AMENDMENT LAW—THE REGULATION OF 
RELIGIOUS LOBBYISTS: A SPIRITUAL BATTLE FOR THE 
SOUL OF DEMOCRACY 
Nicholas Melvin Smith* 
Governmental transparency is among the most fundamental 
requirements of a democracy.  This belief is the backbone of codes of 
ethics amongst both states and the federal government.  Codes of ethics 
universally apply to state employees, as well as those attempting to 
influence policy.  We call these influencers lobbyists.  Every state 
regulates the actions of lobbyists.  Some states have broad, sweeping 
language that requires lobbyists to report a great deal of information to 
the state, which is then made public to voters, while other states allow 
for express exemptions to keep certain actions out of the public eye. 
 
Because the federal government does not provide many guidelines or 
restrictions on what can be included in lobbyist regulation, the states 
have free reign to regulate as they please.  Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Iowa, and Georgia have been able to include broad exemptions to 
lobbyist filing and disclosure rules for those lobbying on behalf of a 
religious institution.  Other states, like Connecticut, have made no direct 
mention of religious organizations in their regulations, but have changed 
the rules to appease or benefit religious groups.  These examples raise 
serious concerns about favoring religious speech over non-religious 
speech. 
 
This Note argues for a more uniform method of regulation on lobbying, 
the goal being to avoid favoring religious lobbying over non-religious 
lobbying.  The need for a more uniform method of regulation will be 
 
* Nicholas Smith is a candidate for J.D. at the Western New England University 
School of Law and a Note Editor for Western New England Law Review.  He spent his 1L 
summer working for the Connecticut Office of State Ethics as a legal intern.  He also 
worked for several religious organizations.  His experiences in lobbying regulation and 
religious life gave him a unique perspective on the regulation of religious lobbyists and he 
tried to approach the topic with both interests at heart. 
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demonstrated by addressing serious policy concerns as well as applying 
principles of the First Amendment regarding both the Freedom of Speech 
and Free Exercise of Religion. 
INTRODUCTION 
“[P]olitics is the allocation of governmental resources; it is who gets 
what, when, where, why, and how.”1  This idea eloquently explains the 
need for interest groups, which are organizations made up of lobbyists.  
Naturally, everyone wants a bigger piece of the pie.  That is, clients are 
willing to pay representatives to further their agenda before a governing 
body.2  Lobbyists are these representatives, and their primary goal is to 
inform and convince lawmakers that their client’s position on an issue is 
the right one.3  This has encouraged the presence of lobbyists in the United 
States since its founding.4  Because of the rapid growth of lobbying in the 
modern era,5 every state has a lobbying law to prescribe what is and what 
is not lobbying, as well as who is and who is not a lobbyist.6 
 
1. RONALD J. HREBENAR & BRYSON B. MORGAN, LOBBYING IN AMERICA: A 
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 1 (2009). 
2. See 2 U.S.C. § 1602(2) (2018) (“The term ‘client’ means any person or entity that 
employs or retains another person for financial or other compensation to conduct lobbying 
activities on behalf of that person or entity.”). 
3. See id.; see also Lobbying, BBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/politics/82529.stm [https://perma.cc/DF33-MSYM]. 
4. See HREBENAR & MORGAN, supra note 1, at 2. 
5. Id. at 110. 
6. See ALA. CODE § 36-25-1.1 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.171 (2018); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-1231 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-8-402 (2018); CAL. GOV’T. CODE 
§ 86300 (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-301 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-91 (2018); 
DEL. CODE ANN tit. 29, § 5831 (2018); D.C. CODE § 1-1161.01 (2018); FLA. STAT. § 11.045 
(2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-70 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 97-1 (2018); IDAHO CODE § 67-
6602 (2018); 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170/2 (2018); IND. CODE § 2-7-1-9 (2018); IOWA CODE 
§ 68B.2 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-222 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.611 (West 2018); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 24:51 (2018); ME. STAT. tit.3, § 312-A (2018); MD. CODE ANN. GEN. PROVIS. 
§ 5-702 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 3, § 39 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 4.415 (2018); 
MINN. STAT. § 10A.01 (2018); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 5-8-3 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.470 
(2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-102 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1433 (2018); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 218H.080 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13C-20 
(West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-2 (2018); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 1-C (McKinney 2018); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-05.1-02 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 101.70 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 4249 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 171.725 
(2018); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13A03 (2018); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-139.1-3 (2018); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 2-17-10 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-12-1, -15 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-6-301 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.003 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-
102 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 261 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-419 (2018); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 42.17A.005 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 6B-3-1 (2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.62 
(West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 28-7-101 (2018); see also How States Define Lobbying and 
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These laws exist not to restrict the speech of lobbyists, but to require 
lobbyists to file registration papers with the state and disclose the amount 
of money and time they spend lobbying.7  Further, 
[L]obbying that occurs in the open is less objectionable than lobbying 
that occurs behind closed doors.  Statements made in public by 
lobbyists can be scrutinized by others and challenged with competing 
facts and arguments.  The resulting public debate is consistent with a 
healthy political process.  In contrast, statements made by lobbyists 
that are hidden from public view cannot easily be probed or disputed.  
Consequently, inaccurate assertions may go uncontested.  Lobbyist 
disclosure requirements reflect these concerns.8 
These laws differ throughout the nation—so much so that nearly all 
of them have at least one significant difference from the others.9  Notable 
among these differences is that many states include exemptions for 
religious lobbyists.10  These laws vary in severity.11  In South Carolina, 
for instance, a 
“[l]obbyist” does not include . . . a person who represents any 
established church solely for the purpose of protecting the rights of the 
membership of the church or for the purpose of protecting the 
doctrines of the church or on matters considered to have an adverse 
effect upon the moral welfare of the membership of the church.12 
 
Lobbyist, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-lobby-definitions.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/J28T-YVHH] (last updated Feb. 8, 2019) [hereinafter States Define 
Lobbying].  This source includes a detailed list of state lobbying definitions and, with its built-
in search bar, comparing religious exemptions is as simple as searching for the word “religious.”  
Id. 
7. See Lobbyist Regulation: Overview, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/
lobbyist-regulation.aspx [https://perma.cc/DKX8-5GVX] [hereinafter Overview]. 
8. Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 49 (2006). 
9. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-91 (providing that registering as a lobbyist requires a 
person to spend three thousand dollars or more in the furtherance of lobbying in any calendar 
year), with OR. REV. STAT. § 171.725 (prescribing that “money or any other consideration” as 
a payment constitutes lobbying). 
10. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 86300(c); 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170/2; IOWA CODE 
§ 68B.2; MD. CODE ANN. GEN. PROVIS. § 5-702(b)(1)(iii); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f) 
(the South Carolina law specifically exempts those representing a “church,” rather than any 
religious actor). 
11. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-70(5) (defining lobbyist with no exemptions for 
religious organizations), with MD. CODE ANN. GEN. PROVIS. § 5-702(b)(1)(iii) (“[Exemption 
for] representation of a bona fide religious organization . . . for the purpose of protecting the 
right of its members to practice the doctrine of the organization.”), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
17-10(13)(f) (extending protection to representatives of “any established church”). 
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f). 
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This broad exemption affords lobbyists working on behalf of a church 
the potential to widely abuse their ability to sway the government without 
the public knowing. 
Ultimately, the problem is the possibility of abuse, not actual 
quantifiable damage done.  That is not to discredit the cognizable damage 
that exists when a state favors religious speech over non-religious speech.  
Religious exemptions in lobbying laws are problematic because they 
allow for situations where religious groups could abuse their exemptions 
and sway politicians without disclosing their actions to the public.13  There 
is also realized harm in the fact that religious institutions are receiving a 
benefit not offered to similarly situated, yet non-religious, groups.14  For 
instance, in South Carolina, a lobbyist on behalf of a church could spend 
any sum of money to sway legislation—or even an election, so long as it 
was logically or at the very least arguably, “considered to have an adverse 
effect upon the moral welfare of the membership of the church.”15 
Specifically, it is possible that a church’s lobbyist in South Carolina 
would be able to spend an undisclosed sum of money to sway the 
legislature from passing a law on abortion.16  It is not unheard of for a 
religious group to lobby against a reproductive bill.17  However, under the 
same law, the opportunity to spend undisclosed amounts of money would 
not be afforded to a lobbyist from a non-religious non-profit 
organization.18  In fact, under this law, it is entirely possible that this 
benefit would only be awarded to Christian lobbyists, as the law 
specifically declares an exemption for those “representing a church.”19  
 
13. See AM. BAR ASS’N, THE LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL 
LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE 8 (William V. Luneberg et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009).  “Government 
has lost hundreds of millions of dollars which it should not have lost if there had been proper 
publicity given to the activities of lobbyists” prior to the passage of Federal Regulation of 
Lobbyists Act.  Id. 
14. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.”). 
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f). 
16. See, e.g., Abortion and Morality: Religious and Moral Influence on the Debate, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/01/support-for-abortion-slips5/ 
[https://perma.cc/66VA-G7YL] (“One-third of Americans (32%) say their religious beliefs are 
the primary influence on their attitudes toward abortion.”). 
17. See generally Zoë Robinson, The Contraception Mandate and the Forgotten 
Constitutional Question, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 749, 793–98 (2014) (examining the manner in 
which a religious lobbying group may challenge a contraception bill). 
18. See § 2-17-10(13)(f). 
19. See id. 
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The problem here is obvious: the South Carolina Ethics Code grants 
obvious favoritism to Christian speech over non-Christian and non-
religious speech. 
The ambiguous structure of religious lobbying regulations is 
attempting to provide broad protections for religious expression, as 
required by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,20 but 
these laws create a systemic preferential treatment towards religious 
speech.21  This creates a danger to the First Amendment as a prohibition 
on non-religious speech.22  This Note argues that the broad nature of 
religious exemptions in lobbying regulations inadvertently favors 
religious speech over non-religious speech, indirectly violating the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  This notion will be 
demonstrated by applying precedent from the Supreme Court on similar, 
although not directly related, issues and arguing that this issue should be 
viewed in the same light. 
Specifically turning to religion, several states have carved out 
exemptions for churches or religious organizations in their lobbying 
bills.23  Instead of evaluating every ethics law and their subsequent 
exceptions, explicit or otherwise, this Note will group them into three 
categories.  The first category is problematic religious exemptions.  This 
includes states, like South Carolina and Maryland,24 with such broad 
exemptions for religious bodies that they effectively grant favoritism 
toward religious speech over non-religious speech.  One of the most 
prominent issues with problematic religious exemptions is the prevalence 
of language which exempts actors from a “bona fide religious 
organization.”25  The Court has been reluctant to rule on what is and is not 
a religion and giving this deference to the states presents serious 
problems.26 
 
20. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2005) (exploring legislative action to 
accommodate religious practice without violating the Establishment clause). 
21. See, e.g., § 2-17-10(13)(f). 
22. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688, 690–93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(explaining the negative message Endorsement sends to nonadherents). 
23. See sources cited supra note 10. 
24. MD. CODE ANN. GEN. PROVIS. § 5-702(b)(1)(iii) (West 2018); § 2-17-10(13)(f). 
25. States Define Lobbying, supra note 6. 
26. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(illustrating that defining what is and is not considered a religious organization presents a serious 
problem, and that laws citing bona-fide religious organization require the governing body to 
make this determination).  Such a distinction is complex and could easily be abused.  Id. 
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The next category is permissible laws—laws with a religious 
exemption that does not violate the First Amendment.  These laws 
explicitly carve out an exemption for religious activity, but do so in a way 
that does not benefit or harm religious institutions.27  This can be seen in 
the religious exemptions to the lobbying law in North Carolina, which “do 
not include communications or activities as part of a business, civic, 
religious, fraternal, personal, or commercial relationship which is not 
connected to legislative or executive action, or both.”28  This type of 
exempted activity is important because it allows lawmakers and lobbyists 
to belong to the same groups, religious or otherwise, without running afoul 
of the ethics code.  However, this exemption does not cover 
communication that attempts to affect the lawmaking process.29 
The last category is optimal laws—those that make no explicit 
mention of religious organizations, which are the largest grouping of 
states’ laws.  Every state has some law defining what a lobbyist is, whether 
they have an enforcement body or not.30  Forty-one states make no 
mention of religious groups in this definition of lobbyist.31  In broadly 
looking to these categories of laws, this Note will demonstrate that laws 
with explicit religious exemptions present serious First Amendment issues 
needing to be addressed. 
Part I of this Note will evaluate a detailed history of the evolution of 
religious beliefs in the context of the way people view the divine through 
the lens of their own desires.  It will then provide a background on several 
political philosophies in application to how lobbying laws are passed and 
 
27. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250(a)(17) (2018). 
28. Id. 
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250(a)(36). 
30. States Define Lobbying, supra note 6. 
31. See ALA. CODE § 36-25-1.1 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 24.45.171 (2018); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-1231 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-8-402 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-
301 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-91 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 5831 (2018); FLA. 
STAT. § 11.045 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-70 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 97-1 (2018); 
IDAHO CODE § 67-6602 (2018); IND. CODE § 2-7-1-9 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-222 
(2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.611 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 24:51 (2018); ME. STAT. 
tit. 3, § 312-A (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 3, § 39 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 4.415 (2018); 
MINN. STAT. § 10A.01 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.470 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-
102 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1433 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 218H.080 (2017); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13C-20 (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2-11-2 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-05.1-02 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.70 (West 
2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 4249 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 171.725 (2018); 65 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 13A03 (2018); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-139.1-3 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-12-1 
(2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3-6-301 (2018); TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 305.003 (2018); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 261 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-419 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 42.17A.005 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 6B-3-1 (2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.62 (West 2018); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 28-7-101 (2018). 
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why the act of lobbying is effective.  It will conclude by describing some 
important aspects of the First Amendment, particularly the chilling effect 
doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine. 
Part II of this Note will evaluate religious lobbying exemptions in 
three categories.  The first category includes laws that are facially 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause; the second 
includes laws that do not present obvious constitutional issues but are 
nonetheless suboptimal; and the third includes laws that make no mention 
of religion. 
Part III of this Note will argue for a uniform application of regulations 
to religious and secular lobbyists.  It will argue that Connecticut has the 
most effective measure for allowing certain benefits to religious groups, 
without violating the First Amendment. 
I. A HISTORY OF RELIGION, POLITICAL THEORY, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Organized religion has been at the forefront of American politics 
since its foundation, “play[ing] a vital role in virtually every major 
political issue in the history of the United States.”32  Religious scholars 
and leaders have been on each side of major issues since this country’s 
inception.33  This fact is also true of state legislatures—not just the federal 
government.34  As lobbying becomes more prevalent, the issues that arise 
with it—like minimal transparency—also grow.35 
Further, due to the proliferation of lobbyists in the modern United 
States, every state has passed a law to define who is a lobbyist, what 
lobbying is, and how to regulate it.36  Since the creation of the first state 
ethics commission in Hawaii in 1968, forty states have established their 
own official ethics commissions,37 Vermont being the most recent state to 
 
32. DANIEL J. B. HOFRENNING, IN WASHINGTON BUT NOT OF IT: THE PROPHETIC 
POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS LOBBYING 1 (1995). 
33. See id. 
34. REPRESENTING GOD AT THE STATEHOUSE vii (Edward L. Cleary & Allen D. Hertzke 
eds., 2006). 
35. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 
26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 562 (2008) (arguing that businesses will spend whatever it takes 
to lobby the government, and that it is ineffective to publicize or tax lobbying). 
36. Overview, supra note 7; see also States Define Lobbying, supra note 6. 
37. Megan Comlossy, Ethics Commissions: Representing the Public Interest, 
LEGISLATIVE LAWYER 1, 2 (2011), made available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/
ethics_commissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/PFC6-5FH2].  Since the publication of this article, 
Vermont has established its own ethics commission.  See An Act Relating to Establishing the 
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do so.38  The remaining states have ethics committees made up of state 
officials.39 
Such “watchdog” agencies exist to provide transparency to the public 
and oversight to the government.40  Typically, they do so in two distinct 
ways.41  The first is through a legal division.42  Offices of state ethics 
typically have an advisory legal branch, which members of the state 
government—or the public—can contact with questions pertaining to real 
situations and the application of the law.43  The second way is through 
prosecution, and most states have a specific prosecutorial division.44  
Generally, this division reviews possible ethics violations by legislators, 
government officials, or lobbyists and prosecutes the violations before 
their state’s board.45 
The prevalence of lobbyists is apparent,46 but religious lobbying has 
the proclivity to slip through the cracks.  These lobbying groups tend to 
be unregistered, so tracking their actions is nearly impossible, and, further, 
only a small group of religious lobbyists have official “Political Action 
Committees.”47  The involvement of evangelical Christians is important 
in American politics, as they make up a considerable portion of the 
electorate.48  These voters traditionally vote for Republicans,49  largely 
thanks to President Ronald Reagan and his efforts in the 1980s to involve 
 
State Ethics Commission and Standards of Governmental Ethical Conduct, 2017 Vt. Acts & 
Resolves 79. 
38. 2017 Vt. Acts & Resolves 79. 
39. See Comlossy, supra note 37. 
40. See id. 
41. See, e.g., Agency Units, OFF. ST. ETHICS, http://ct.gov/ethics/cwp/
view.asp?a=3510&q=415018 [https://perma.cc/9WQH-HPBV] (explaining the distinct 
functions of the two branches of the ethics office, including the Legal and Enforcement 
divisions). 
42. Id. 
43. E.g., id. 
44. E.g., id. 
45. See, e.g., id. 
46. See generally Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/ [https://perma.cc/N2WE-YQ4N] (demonstrating the constant increase in annual lobbyist 
expenditures). 
47. See HOFRENNING, supra note 32, at 189. 
48. See Religious Landscape Study, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/ [https://perma.cc/2V7U-B538] (finding that evangelical Christians make up 
more than a quarter of voters). 
49. See Michael Lipka, U.S. Religious Groups and Their Political Leanings, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/23/u-s-religious-groups-
and-their-political-leanings/ [https://perma.cc/6XSY-LPGB]. 
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evangelicals in politics.50  The prevalence of religion in politics has 
certainly stuck around, and now the evangelical vote is highly sought 
after.51  Religious groups are increasingly complicated to regulate when it 
comes to lobbying because many of them are not registered lobbyists, 
which is forbidden under their status as a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) 
organization.52  This makes balancing their regulation with the intricacies 
of the tax code quite difficult and could be why many states choose to 
exempt them from lobbying registration.53  However, this is problematic, 
as it inherently creates favoritism for religious affiliation or expression 
over the same non-religious expression.54  States should remedy this 
problem by prohibiting beneficial treatment for religious groups, and this 
Note will provide suggestions for how to best achieve this goal. 
The primary focus of ethics law is to increase transparency between 
the citizens of each state and their governments.55  So then why would 
some states elect to muddy the waters by exempting some of the largest 
interest groups in the country?  This is a complex question—one that 
requires introspection on the way society views religion and how it uses 
religion to interact with each other.  This question also requires a 
discussion of the political interest lawmakers have in passing certain 
statutes. 
 
50. HOFRENNING, supra note 32, at 36–37. 
51. Brian Vines, The Evangelical Vote: Will 94 Million Americans Sit Out This Year’s 
Election?, GUARDIAN (June 21, 2016, 11:29 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/jun/21/evangelical-vote-us-elections [https://perma.cc/XP5E-JDHD]; see also Gregory A. 
Smith, Churchgoing Republicans, Once Skeptical of Trump, Now Support Him, PEW RES. CTR. 
(July 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/21/churchgoing-republicans-
once-skeptical-of-trump-now-support-him/ [https://perma.cc/SR82-9H2U]. 
52. See HOFRENNING, supra note 32, at 189.  Section 501(c)(3) is ultimately a tax-exempt 
status held by many religious organizations.  The benefits of this tax-exempt status come with 
restrictions, specifically a prohibition on “influenc[ing] legislation . . . or interven[ing] 
in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”  
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). 
53. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  Under this section of the tax code, an organization does not 
qualify for exemption if a “substantial part of [its] activit[y]” is lobbying.  Id.  Regulations could 
create complications in determining what is “substantial.”  See also Political Campaign 
Activities—Risks to Tax-Exempt Status, NAT’L COUNCIL NONPROFITS, 
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/political-campaign-activities-risks-tax-
exempt-status [https://perma.cc/4RQH-UZNY].  “Lobbying is NOT the same as political 
campaign activity.  Engaging in lobbying by charitable nonprofits is permitted, but expending 
more than an ‘insubstantial’ amount of energy or resources towards lobbying activities can be 
problematic.”  Id. 
54. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 719 (2005) (holding that an endorsement of 
multiple religions is as unconstitutional as an endorsement of one single religion). 
55. See Comlossy, supra note 37, at 1. 
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A. What is Religion? 
Religion plays a vital role in American life.56  A 2015 study found 
that approximately seventy-six percent of Americans identify as religious 
in one way or another.57  The overwhelming majority of Americans—
some seventy percent—belong to a Christian faith.58  But why does the 
religious makeup of the country affect the political process?  The answer 
is not as simple as discussing the foundation of the United States and the 
inherent religiosity of its people.  The real answer lies much further back 
in our collective history.59 
To understand religion’s influence on politics, one must understand 
religion.  The foundations of human faith date as far back as we can trace 
our ancestors—all the way to the cave paintings that signify the migratory 
patterns of homo-sapiens.60  Scholars contend that the placement, 
consistency, and substance of these cave paintings indicate that they are 
representative of Paleolithic humans’ religious beliefs.61  One idea of the 
Paleolithic human religious experience suggests that they believed in a 
“tiered cosmos.”62  This theory suggests that the Paleolithic humans 
believed that by crawling remarkably deep within caves, they could 
immerse themselves in a separate realm of the cosmos; one that existed 
deep within the earth.63  They painted these caves full of images that laid 
out the Paleolithic view of the divine.64  As they moved through the caves, 
 
56. See generally Chapter 1: Importance of Religion and Religious Beliefs, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/chapter-1-importance-of-religion-
and-religious-beliefs/ [https://perma.cc/6CFC-HXBB] (explaining the importance of religious 
beliefs in American life). 
57. See Religious Landscape Study, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ [https://perma.cc/2V7U-B538]. 
58. Id. 
59. See generally REZA ASLAN, GOD: A HUMAN HISTORY (2017) (explaining a detailed 
history of the evolution of human thought on God). 
60. DAVID LEWIS-WILLIAMS, CONCEIVING GOD: THE COGNITIVE ORIGIN AND 
EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 210 (2010); see also ASLAN, supra note 59, at 7–16. 
61. See LEWIS-WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 7–16; c.f. Kevin Sharpe & Leslie Van Gelder, 
Human Uniqueness and Upper Paleolithic ‘Art’: An Archaeologist’s Reaction to Wentzel van 
Huyssteen’s Gifford Lectures, 28 AM. J. THEOLOGY & PHIL. 311 (2006) (arguing against a 
religious interpretation of the cave painting but noting that many scholars have argued for a 
religious contextual interpretation of the “art”). 
62. See LEWIS-WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 210. 
63. See ASLAN, supra note 59, at 8. 
64. See id. 
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the paintings got more detailed.65  Perhaps the most impressive of these 
early human paintings is one called “The Sorcerer.”66 
This painting was discovered in 1914, and was instantly recognized 
as a special symbol of cult worship.67  The original discoverer of the cave 
painting, Henri Breuil, a French priest, made a tracing of the painting and 
published it along with his notes about the cave in 1920.68  In his notes, he 
referred to the painting as the first known image of God.69  Whether the 
Paleolithic humans that painted the image believed it was God is a matter 
up for debate, but it is at least clear that the image depicted a deeply held 
religious idea.70  This idea is the interconnectedness of the world, which 
is something scholars have known about the Paleolithic people for some 
time; it is an idea they have coined as animism.71  This first conception of 
a religious belief is that everything is connected by something: a spirit, an 
essence, a soul—something transcendent from the body.72  Animism is not 
inherently a religion, but it is a foundational belief that, over time, evolved 
into organized religion.73 
The evolution of religion can be seen in the progress from cave 
paintings and burial mounds to the complex structure of early temples.74  
Göbekli Tepe is the earliest known temple in the world, dating somewhere 
 
65. See id. at 8–17 (exploring how the cave paintings developed from the front of the cave 
into the depths). 
66. Id. at 16. 
67. Trois Frères: Cave, Ariège, France, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Trois-Freres#Article-History [https://perma.cc/ZB5T-
J4W9]; see also ASLAN, supra note 59, at 17. 
68. ASLAN, supra note 59, at 9–18; see also Henri Begouen, Un Dessin Relevé Dans la 
Caverne des Trois-Frères, à Montesquieu-Avantès (Ariège) 64 COMPTES RENDUS DES SÉANCES 
DE L’ACADÉMIE DES INSCRIPTIONS ET BELLES-LETTRES 303, 305 (1920), 
http://www.persee.fr/doc/crai_0065-0536_1920_num_64_4_74336 [https://perma.cc/47RY-
PV2Z].  The original journal is rather obscure and completely in French.  The University of De 
Lyon in France has made it publicly available through its free online digital library. 
69. See ASLAN, supra note 59, at 9–18; see also Begouen, supra note 68. 
70. See generally Alberto C. Blanc, Some Evidence for the Ideologies of Early Man, in 
SOCIAL LIFE OF EARLY MAN (1961).  This book attempts to reconstruct the life of early 
societies; particular emphasis is laid upon social behavior among primates, as well as 
approaches from ethnology, prehistoric archaeology, geography, genetics, human stress 
biology, and psychology.  Id. 
71. ASLAN, supra note 59, at 6–7. 
72. Id. 
73. See id. at 7 & n.7 (arguing that animism was the first step in the evolution of human 
thought on God). 
74. Id. at 7–8. 
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around 9600 to 8000 BCE; it sits in modern day southeastern Turkey.75  
The pillars in the center of Göbekli Tepe are not quite pillars at all—they 
have arms adorned with jewelry, loincloths around their waists, and 
rectangular, undecorated heads.76  These humanoid figures without faces 
are thought to be an abstraction of a deity.77  This temple with the faceless 
gods is not close to a source of water, and there are no signs of dwelling 
places nearby, which indicates that the temple was traveled to, that it is, 
perhaps, a holy site.78  From the Paleolithic cave painting of God to the 
Neolithic statues, the divine became less an amalgamation of man and 
beast, but more uniquely human.79 
This trend of developing a human version of the divine continued for 
several thousand years.80  The use of human terms and imagery can be 
seen in all of the world’s major religions, even nontheistic religions like 
Buddhism or Jainism.81 
In fact, the entire history of human spirituality can be viewed as one 
long, interconnected, ever-evolving, and remarkably cohesive effort to 
make sense of the divine by giving it our emotions and our 
personalities, by ascribing to it our traits and our desires, by providing 
it with our strengths and our weaknesses, even our own bodies—in 
short, by making God us.82 
That is to say, our deepest ideas of the divine are conditioned by our 
understanding of ourselves.  Through the evolution of our thought on God, 
we have consistently intensified our personification of our perception of 
the divine.83 
Human characteristics bestowed upon the divine are evidenced in a 
number of examples,84 but are nowhere more obvious than America’s 
 
75. CLAUDIA SAGONA, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF PUNIC MALTA: FROM THE NEOLITHIC TO 
THE ROMAN PERIOD 47 (2015). 
76. ASLAN, supra note 59, at 55. 
77. Id. at 55–57. 
78. Id. at 54–55. 
79. See id. at 57. 
80. See id. at xiii. 
81. Id. at xiv–xv. 
82. Id. at xiii. 
83. Id. at 49–107 (exploring the humanization of God throughout the evolution of 
religions, from ancient to modern). 
84. See REZA ASLAN, NO GOD BUT GOD: THE ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE OF 
ISLAM (2005) (exploring the evolution of religion); BRITANNICA EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHING, 
MESOPOTAMIAN GODS & GODDESSES (2014) (explaining the religious beliefs of the 
Mesopatamians); FRED W. CLOTHEY, RELIGION IN INDIA: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
(2006) (explaining religious traditions and beliefs in India); JOHN DAY, YAHWEH AND THE 
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most popular religion—Christianity.85  The Christian tradition of a 
completely human and completely divine savior of the world is quite 
familiar to the modern reader.86  However, this idea was extremely 
controversial to the early church.87 
Through all of religious history, humankind has consistently 
personified the very notion of the divine;88 the theology of which could 
fill volumes.  But what is apparent about this humanizing of God is that it 
helps to understand the convictions and beliefs of religious lobbyists.89  
These lobbyists believe they are acting out the will of the divine, which 
makes them much harder to negotiate with than a lobbyist who is just in it 
for the money.  Before one can fully understand that process though, the 
politics of lobbying must be addressed. 
B. A Background on Political Theory and the Political Process 
Why does lobbying work?  That question begs a more fundamental 
one—why do politicians vote the way that they do?  This question, 
 
GODS AND GODDESSES OF CANAAN (2000) (exploring the Canaanite faith and its many deities); 
JON MIKALSON, ANCIENT GREEK RELIGION (2005) (exploring the religious practices of the 
ancient Greeks); PETER HARVEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHISM: TEACHINGS, HISTORY 
AND PRACTICES (1990) (reviewing the history and evolution of the Buddhist faith); JENNY 
ROSE, ZOROASTRIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION (2011) (explaining the Zoroastrian faith); 
ALFRED WIEDEMANN, RELIGION OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS (1897) (taking an in-depth look 
at the religious practice of the ancient Egyptian civilization). 
85. Cf. John 1:14.  The author of the Gospel of John writes, “[t]he Word became flesh and 
made his dwelling among us.  We have seen his glory, the glory of the one and only Son, who 
came from the Father, full of grace and truth.”  Id.  In saying this, the author is inherently 
claiming both the divinity and humanity of Jesus.  While he is not arguing the same point as this 
Note, his argument is analogous to the stated claim.  The Christian tradition moves ahead of all 
the other world’s religions in humanizing the divine by holding that God was quite literally a 
human at one point in time.  The Christian tradition holds belief in a Trinitarian view of God, 
which is that God exists in three distinct bodies, while maintaining unity.  The Gospel of John 
is among the most profound sources for this claim in the Christian tradition, as it moves 
significantly past the monotheistic foundations of Judaism and blazes a new trail of semi-
monotheistic Trinitarian-ism.  Accord ASLAN, supra note 59, at 129–46; REZA ASLAN, ZEALOT: 
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JESUS OF NAZARETH 163–216 (2013). 
86. See generally ALISTER E. MCGRATH, CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(Blackwell, 6th ed. 2017) (detailing the history of theological views of Christian scholars). 
87. See generally JUSTO GONZÁLEZ, THE STORY OF CHRISTIANITY (1984) (including a 
detailed historical analysis of the history of Christianity and particularly the first Council of 
Nicaea); see also ASLAN supra note 59, at 141–46. 
88. ASLAN, supra note 59, at xiv–xv. 
89. See generally HOFRENNING, supra note 32 (explaining why and how religious 
lobbyists act differently than non-religious lobbyists). 
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unfortunately, does not have one simple and concise answer.90  However, 
it can be answered, at least somewhat, through an understanding of a few 
political theories and their real-world application.91 
The first important discussion in understanding the political process 
should be reviewing why and how government exists.  John Locke is 
perhaps the most notable thinker to explore this realm of thought.92  He 
claimed that all men are inherently free and that the existence of the 
government was simply a social contract, which is a consent to forgo some 
freedoms in exchange for the enjoyment of stable and comfortable lives.93  
This is called social contract theory.94  It ultimately holds that the 
governing body of any land is only in power by the express or tacit consent 
of the people.95  That is, all power in politics ultimately originates from 
the governed, not the government.96 
Next, Anthony Downs theorized that if constituencies were perfectly 
informed, politicians would naturally assume the political stance preferred 
by the median voter.97  However, he argues that the public stays 
uninformed, allowing politicians to deviate from this economic model.98  
This idea is an application of economic game theory to politics.99  The 
primary purpose of game theory is to describe why humans act the way 
 
90. See SUDHA SETTY, NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY: COMPARATIVE EFFECTS ON 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 40 (2017) (explaining political realism theory and why 
politicians make the decisions they make). 
91. See id. at 37–41. 
92. See generally W. JULIAN KORAB- KARPOWICZ, ON THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS FROM THUCYDIDES TO LOCKE (2012) 
(demonstrating the evolution of political history leading up to John Locke).  John Locke was an 
enlightenment-era philosopher and is hailed as the father of liberalism.  Id.  His thoughts on 
liberal theory and classical republicanism can be seen in the writings of the founders of the 
United States and even in the Declaration of Independence.  Id. 
93. See Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 
(Summer 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/locke-political/ 
[https://perma.cc/8GJ2-V4YN]. 
94. See id.; Social Contract, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/
topic/social-contract [https://perma.cc/84KK-UYKS]. 
95. Tuckness, supra note 93. 
96. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
97. See generally Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a 
Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135 (1957) (explaining political actions through the lens of 
economics).  Anthony Downs is an economist specializing in public policy.  See PATRICIA 
MOSS WIGFALL & BEHROOZ KALANTARI, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 25 (2001). 
98. See Downs, supra note 97, at 139. 
99. See id. at 135–39. 
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they do.100  In application to politics, it has been used to explain 
democratic peace,101 to mitigate the Cuban Missile Crisis,102 and as a 
proposal to solve the issue of climate change.103  Ultimately, it attempts to 
predict actions based on an equation of probabilities.104 
Finally, realist political theory holds that “the political process is 
governed by the politician’s pursuit of self-interest in order to ensure his 
political survival.”105  Under this theory, politics can be explained simply 
as the constant effort by lawmakers to win reelection.106  That is, if most 
of a legislator’s constituency is religious, the legislator will logically 
prefer laws that benefit religious practice.107  If an interest group offers to 
spend an incredibly large sum of money to help the lawmaker win 
reelection in exchange for a vote on a piece of legislation, the lawmaker 
is logically going to agree.108  Even scholars arguing for the legislative 
ability to create religious exemptions should notice the cause of concern 
created by legislative preference always going to majority-followed 
religions.109 
By understanding these prevailing theories of the political process, 
lobbying makes considerably more sense.  If a lawmaker applies these 
three notions of political theory to their work, logically they will pass, or 
at the very least support, laws that their constituents agree with.110  By the 
same token, they will oppose ideas antithetical to their constituents.111  
This is where lobbying comes in, particularly because voters are not 
 
100. See ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 1 (1991). 
101. See generally Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, It Takes Two: An Explanation of the 
Democratic Peace, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1, 1–10 (2004) (explaining peace treaties using game 
theory). 
102. Steven J. Brams, Game Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis, PLUS MAG. (Jan. 1, 
2001), https://plus.maths.org/content/game-theory-and-cuban-missile-crisis [https://perma.cc/
8W3V-QZZL] (explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis using game theory). 
103. See generally Peter John Wood, Climate Change and Game Theory: A Mathematical 
Survey, 1219 ECOLOGICAL ECON. REV. 153 (2011) (explaining climate change policies using 
game theory). 
104. MYERSON, supra note 100, at 1–4. 
105. SETTY, supra note 90. 
106. See id. at 40–41. 
107. Cf. id. at 40 (arguing that the interest of subordinate groups can only be furthered if 
they coexist with the interest of the lawmaker). 
108. See id. 
109. See Zoë Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process 
Theory of Statutory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 177 (2011). 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
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perfectly informed.112  Interest groups represent the ideas of their 
members.113  They also could spend nearly unlimited capital in their 
efforts to sway legislation or public opinion.114  Applying these political 
theories to interest groups, it logically follows that politicians will act in 
their own interest, following the will of the governed, in an equation 
designed to increase the chance of political survival.115 
C. A Background on Other First Amendment Jurisprudence 
This section will evaluate some important doctrines of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  It will begin with a discussion of the chilling 
effect doctrine and follow with a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine.  
In doing so, it is also important to consider the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment, which prohibits the government from recognizing 
an official religion.116  Also prohibited under the First Amendment is the 
endorsement of a religious idea or the prevention of any religious idea,117 
however, some jurists, like Antonin Scalia, would disagree.118  Ultimately, 
when ruling on a First Amendment question, “the Court will engage in a 
form of balancing analysis, and its jurisprudence suggests that the 
balancing will favor the government.”119 
1. The Chilling Effect Doctrine 
The chilling effect doctrine finds its roots in a dissenting opinion 
authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren.120  Warren wrote, “[T]he fear of 
the censor by the composer of ideas acts as a substantial deterrent to the 
creation of new thoughts.”121  Through this idea, the Court would find 
 
112. See Downs, supra note 97, at 139. 
113. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (prohibiting employers 
from preventing their employees to unionize).  Unions are among the most common interest 
groups and are a great example of an interest group representing its members directly. 
114. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(holding that business entities can spend unlimited sums to influence elections). 
115. See SETTY, supra note 90, at 40–41. 
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
117. See generally Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) 
(holding that the city allowing a private party to display a cross in a public space was not an 
“endorsement” that would invalidate the action under the First Amendment). 
118. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 
449, 461 (2000). 
119. Zoë Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows: Religious Interest Groups in the Legislative 
Process, 64 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1097 (2015). 
120. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1961) (Warren, J., dissenting). 
121. Id. at 75. 
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ways to apply a restriction on laws that deterred, or chilled, protected 
expression.122  The chilling effect doctrine is comprised of two substantial 
points.  First, there must be an actual chilling.123  Second, if a chilling 
exists, then courts must apply a strict scrutiny analysis.124  The Court has 
held that “where there is no concrete evidence of a chilling effect, it is for 
the court to evaluate the likelihood of [a] chilling effect under the 
circumstances, and determine whether the risk involved is justified.”125  
The Court has also stated that “perfect clarity and precise guidance have 
never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive 
activity.”126 
The chilling effect doctrine should be the governing constitutional 
principle in lobbying regulations, and states should avoid chilling 
protected speech and religious practice.  However, there is clearly a 
compelling governmental interest in promoting public transparency to 
governmental dealings,127 as is required for a law to pass strict scrutiny.128  
The laws in question must also be narrowly tailored or the least restrictive 
means possible to achieve the governmental interest.129  This Note will 
analyze lobbying registration laws and apply the strict scrutiny analysis 
and the chilling effect doctrine to them. 
2. The Overbreadth Doctrine 
The overbreadth doctrine regulates vagueness in laws that deal 
specifically with protected rights such as free speech and religious 
 
122. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). 
123. See Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–73, 78 (1976) (ruling that 
because a zoning ordinance did not sufficiently deter the production or sale of adult movies, no 
actual chilling existed). 
124. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 72–73 (1981).  The strict 
scrutiny balancing test calls for a compelling governmental interest and that the law in question 
must be narrowly tailored, or the least restrictive means possible of achieving the governmental 
interest.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“The essence of all that has 
been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those 
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”). 
125. Australia/E. U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 807, 811 
(D.C. 1982), vacating as moot and remanded, No. 82-1516, 82-1683, 1986 WL 1165605 
(D.D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 1986) (emphasis added). 
126. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989). 
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
128. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–40 (2003) (holding that a school 
admissions policy had sufficiently overcome strict scrutiny when applying the balancing test). 
129. Id. 
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expression.130  “According to our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, 
a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected 
speech.”131  Under this doctrine, laws can be found unconstitutional if they 
prohibit too much protected speech.132  However, in direct application to 
lobbying disclosure rules for religious organizations, the overbreadth 
doctrine does not prohibit states from exerting the same regulations on 
religious groups that it would to non-religious groups. 
This idea can be clearly seen in an opinion written by the Connecticut 
Citizen’s Ethics Advisory Commission, which provides that “[w]hat 
determines whether [an entity] . . . is lobbying is its intent in furnishing 
the information.  If it is for the purpose of influencing legislative [or 
administrative] action, it is lobbying.  Conversely, if it is not for the 
purpose of influencing legislative [or administrative] action, it is not 
lobbying.”133  The opinion went on to state that, although the entity “is the 
best judge of its intent in providing information[,] . . . [i]ntent . . . can be 
manifested objectively in a number of ways.”134  Under this precedent, the 
Connecticut Office of State Ethics (Connecticut OSE) is qualified to 
review protected speech in the context of a compelling governmental 
interest.135  The Connecticut OSE already reviews various specific factual 
circumstances in their application to the Code of Ethics.136  Other states 
should apply the same logic to the dealings of religious groups in the 
political process and require religious groups to register with their 
governing bodies to promote transparency for the voters. 
D. Intersectionality of These Ideas in Religious Lobbying 
In applying all three of these complex ideas to the practice of religious 
lobbying in America, the involvement of religion in the political process 
will make more sense.  Under the argued foundation of religion, humans 
inherently apply our own desires to the divine;137 that is, our desires 
become God’s desires.138  Politics can be described simply as the result of 
 
130. See generally Recent Case, Overbreadth Doctrine, 122 HARV. L. REV. 385, 385–88 
(2008) (noting that under the overbreadth doctrine, statutes can be found “void for vagueness”). 
131. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (emphasis added). 
132. Id. 
133. Conn. St. Ethics Comm’n, Advisory Opinion No. 78-13 (Aug. 4, 1978). 
134. Id. 
135. See id. 
136. See Conn. St. Ethics Comm’n, Advisory Opinion No. 1994-11 (1994); see also Conn. 
St. Ethics Comm’n, Advisory Opinion No. 2009-6 (July 23, 2009). 
137. See supra Section I.A. 
138. See ASLAN, supra note 59, at xii. 
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an equation—the consent of the governed coupled with their imperfect 
knowledge, added to the desires of interest groups with deep pockets; 
calculating this should give a politician an indication of the best chance 
for political survival (i.e., reelection).139 
This exact scenario can be seen clearly in the actions of now-Senator 
Richard Blumenthal when he was the Attorney General of Connecticut.140  
In 2009, the Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (“the 
Church”) filed a federal lawsuit against officials of the Connecticut 
OSE.141  The Church alleged that the method by which all lobbying in the 
state of Connecticut is regulated was restrictive to the point of creating a 
chilling effect on their constitutionally protected religious expression.142  
The lawsuit was in response to an OSE investigation into the actions of 
the Church.143  Particularly, the Church spent several days, and a large 
sum of money, to rally its members against “Raised Bill 1098” in March 
of 2009.144  The Church alleged the proposed legislation was 
unconstitutional and wanted to challenge it before it ever became law.145  
It did just that by using its website and churches, rallying members of the 
Diocese, and bussing them to Hartford for a protest.146  This prompted an 
evaluation from the OSE.147 
The evaluation was based on Connecticut state law that regulates 
lobbyists.148  It was clear, based on the size of the rally, that the Church 
had spent enough money, in an admitted attempt to influence legislation, 
 
139. See supra Sections I.A–C. 
140. See generally Op. Att’y Gen. 2009-006 (June 30, 2009), 2009 WL 1904432 (Conn. 
A.G.) [hereinafter Opinion Letter] (arguing that the enforcement of the ethics code upon a 
religious group violated the first amendment). 
141. See generally Complaint, Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Jones, No. 
3:09-CV-00851, 2009 WL 4313525 (D. Conn. 2009) [hereinafter Complaint] (litigating the 
enforcement of the ethics code upon the Bridgeport church). 
142. See id. ¶ 1. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. ¶ 2 (arguing that Raised Bill 1098 attempted to create an oversight board of 
laypeople to regulate the Catholic church in Connecticut); see Opinion Letter, supra note 140, 
at *1; see also An Act Modifying Corporate Laws Relating to Certain Religious Corporations, 
S.B. 1098, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009), http://www.cga.ct.gov/
2009/TOB/S/2009SB-01098-R00-SB.htm [https://perma.cc/XPY3-B5M4]. 
145. See Complaint, supra note 141, ¶¶ 1–2. 
146. Id. ¶ 23; see also Christine Stuart, Catholic Church Sues State Over Lobbying 
Provision, CT NEWS JUNKIE (May 29, 2009, 9:20 PM), https://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/
archives/entry/catholic_church_sues_state_over_lobbying_provision [https://perma.cc/3QQG-
P983]. 
147. Complaint, supra note 141, ¶¶ 6, 37. 
148. Id. 
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to require lobbyist registration under the Code of Ethics.149  The Church 
responded with a lawsuit claiming that the lobbyist registration and 
disclosure requirements violated its constitutional right to free exercise 
under the First Amendment.150  The Attorney General agreed with the 
Church and informed the OSE that the registration and disclosure 
requirements being applied were, in his opinion, constitutionally 
questionable.151  He expressed his concern by writing an opinion that 
seriously misapplied the First Amendment,152 and argued for an 
exemption to the code that would be popular, but would dilute 
transparency.153  Blumenthal insisted OSE and the legislature update the 
definition of “expenditure” in the Connecticut Code of Ethics.154 
The Attorney General’s letter contended that the legislation be 
changed to exclude costs of transportation and communications by a group 
intended for its members.155  The letter, which stated the Attorney 
General’s concerns, prompted the OSE to propose several legislative 
changes.156  Among them is the amendment to the definition of 
“expenditure” under the Code of Ethics.157 
Ultimately, the Bridgeport case was voluntarily withdrawn because 
the OSE, considering the Attorney General’s letter, decided not to pursue 
enforcement action.158  The letter issued by Attorney General Blumenthal 
 
149. Id.; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-94 (2018) (noting that the dollar amount to require 
registration was raised from $2,000 to $3,000 in 2016); see also An Act Amending the Code of 
Ethics for Lobbyists to Redefine “Expenditure” and Raise the Threshold for Lobbyist 
Registration, 2015 Conn. Pub. Acts. 15-15 (Reg. Sess.). 
150. See generally Complaint, supra note 141, ¶¶ 1–2 (alleging that enforcement of the 
ethics code violated the church’s first amendment rights). 
151. See Opinion Letter, supra note 140, at *3. 
152. Attorney General Blumenthal argued that the existence of a chilling effect was 
facially intolerable, completely ignoring decades of precedent on the very issue, and the 
requirement for a strict scrutiny analysis.  See id. 
153. See id. at *4 (noting that “[t]he legislature should consider clarifying the scope of 
this exemption” to include the expenditure made by Bridgeport). 
154. Id. 
155. Opinion Letter, supra note 140, at *2; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-91(6)(B)–(C) (2018).  
Section C reflects the change the Attorney General argued for in his opinion letter.  Id. 
156. See An Act Amending the Code of Ethics for Lobbyists to Redefine  
“Expenditure” and Raise the Threshold for Lobbyist Registration, 2015 Conn. Pub. Acts. 15-15 
(Reg. Sess.). 
157. § 1-91(6). 
158. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Jones, 
No. 3:09-cv-00851, 2009 (D. Conn. July 2, 2009). 
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created ambiguity in the enforceability of the law that must be clarified.159  
This ambiguity also has the potential to lead to more lawsuits. 
Through this complex and legally questionable process, Blumenthal 
saw that the Church was using its desires, and applying them to the divine 
by quite literally preaching them from the pulpit.160  Church members 
rallied, showing him their numbers and power, along with their political 
will.161  Blumenthal responded with a letter that misapplied constitutional 
law in a clear attempt to appease the church.162  Applying the political 
theory principles previously demonstrated to this action,163 Mr. 
Blumenthal acted to preserve his own self-interest.164  Christians make up 
seventy percent of Connecticut, and more specifically, Catholics make up 
thirty-three percent of the state.165  The next year, Attorney General 
Blumenthal got a promotion and became United States Senator 
Blumenthal.166  He took fifty-five percent of the votes in the state,167 and 
carried Hartford, as well as the New York City suburb area of Connecticut 
where Bridgeport sits.168  While no polling data on the specific religious 
preferences of Blumenthal voters exists from the 2010 election, a logical 
conclusion is that Blumenthal’s 2009 opinion aided his political survival, 
and in this case, helped him achieve a position on a much larger stage.169 
Now that a definition of religion, the political process, and the law 
has been demonstrated in the real world of political happenings, this Note 
 
159. See Opinion Letter, supra note 140, at *3 (calling a chilling effect facially intolerable 
and alleging that the registration and disclosure requirements in the Code of Ethics violated the 
church’s right to religious expression). 
160. See Complaint, supra note 141, ¶ 20. 
161. See generally id. 
162. See generally Opinion Letter, supra note 140 (arguing that the mere existence of 
chilling effect was enough to make the application of the law intolerable). 
163. See supra Section I.C. 
164. See supra Section I.B; see also Setty, supra note 90 (explaining political realism 
theory and why politicians make the decisions they make). 
165. Adults in Connecticut, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/state/connecticut/ [https://perma.cc/4EQE-7UNG]. 
166. See David M. Halbfinger, Blumenthal Wins in Connecticut to Take Dodd’s Seat, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/nyregion/03ctsen.html 
[https://perma.cc/QPM3-YFTV]. 
167. Katie Thomas, Election 2010: Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
elections/2010/results/connecticut.html [https://perma.cc/NX3A-5Q58]. 
168. See Election 2010: Connecticut Senate Exit Polls, N.Y. TIMES (2010) 
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2010/results/senate/exit-polls.html#connecticut 
[https://perma.cc/ZV8Q-WFAS] (demonstrating that Blumenthal won in both urban and 
suburban areas of the state, which would include Hartford and the suburban area where 
Bridgeport sits). 
169. See Halbfinger, supra note 166. 
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argues that the regulation of religious lobbyists in an identical way to non-
religious lobbyists is the most preferential legal treatment. 
II. THE THREE DIVISIONS OF LOBBYING REGULATION 
Religious liberties are not compromised when religious organizations 
are held to the same standard as their secular counterparts regarding 
lobbying regulations.  Equal application of the law is the most favorable 
way to handle the complex constitutional questions raised by the issue 
because it avoids the possibility of an “endorsement” challenge.170  Some 
states have explicitly exempted certain religious lobbying activities that 
may be permissible under the First Amendment from their definition of 
“lobbying.”171  However, even these permissible laws172 are suboptimal. 
The United States Supreme Court has created a test for evaluating 
establishment clause claims to determine whether the state in question has 
given preferential treatment to religion.173  This test is essentially a test of 
endorsement,174 which in this context means “an expression or 
demonstration of approval or support.”175  The Court also equates this test 
with “promotion” or “favoritism.”176  So, in determining the 
constitutionality of these lobbying laws, one should look to the primary 
purpose and effect of the law.177  In the application of this endorsement 
test, an endorsement exists when a reasonable observer would infer 
promotion or favoritism of religious expression by the government.178  
The Court has also made clear that “neutral government policies that 
 
170. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995).  
“Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it . . . is . . . publicly 
announced and open to all on equal terms.”  Id. at 770. 
171. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250(a)(17) (2018) (exempting religious 
communications not related to legislative or executive action from being considered lobbying). 
172. See generally Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 769–70 (holding that the city allowing a 
private party to display a cross in a public space was not an “endorsement” that would invalidate 
the action under the First Amendment). 
173. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).  “Three such tests may be gleaned 
from our cases.  First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must 
not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”  Id. (citations omitted). 
174. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 763 (noting that the test petitioners asked for is not a test 
of endorsement at all, and certainly is not the endorsement test that Court had developed). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
178. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 763–64. 
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happen to benefit religion” do not equate to endorsement, and thus are not 
in violation of the Establishment Clause.179 
A. Inherently Problematic Laws 
Some states have put forth laws that are facially unconstitutional.180  
These laws grant an express benefit to religious speech that is not granted 
to non-religious speech and thus would not stand up to the endorsement 
test.181  For example, the South Carolina law discussed previously is the 
most egregious.182  It not only exempts protected religious activity, like 
defending the right of its members to practice whatever doctrine they 
practice, but also protects against anything “considered to have an adverse 
effect upon the moral welfare of the membership of the church.”183  This 
law is problematic for several reasons. 
Most notably, it clearly favors religious speech over non-religious 
speech, and the text facially gives preferential treatment to those 
representing a church.184  Under the endorsement test, this can be seen 
evidently as promoting, favoring, or endorsing religious activity.185  This 
is problematic because non-religious organizations may also have strong 
moral convictions deriving from something other than religion.186  If the 
purpose of the exemption is to allow one to defend “moral welfare,” it 
does so erroneously and in violation of the Establishment Clause.187 
While problems with the South Carolina law abound, creating an 
effective solution is complicated.  First, the issue has never been raised to 
the regulatory body in South Carolina.188  When asked about the issue, the 
director of the South Carolina Ethics Commission responded, “The SC 
Ethics Commission has not encountered a circumstance where an 
individual claimed a registration exemption for serving in a position that 
 
179. Id. at 754, 769–70. 
180. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
181. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
182. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f) (2018). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995). 
186. See generally STEVE CIRRONE, SECULAR MORALITY: RHETORIC AND READER 
(2015) (demonstrating the ability to make a moral argument without adherence to a religious 
doctrine). 
187. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
188. E-mail from Steven Hamm, Interim Chairman of the S. C. Ethics Comm’n, to 
Nicholas Smith (Nov. 16, 2017, 11:48 AM) (on file with author). 
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represents any established church.”189  He went on to clarify that the 
provisions in the code that restrict gifts on lawmakers would still apply to 
them.190  Thus, even lobbyists covered by this exemption would not be 
able to bribe legislators.191  Since this law has never been defined further 
by the ethics commission in an advisory or formal opinion, it has never 
been appealed to the Court, and thus has been allowed to stand because of 
its obscure status.192 
However, it still creates an inherent problem.  Specifically, in South 
Carolina, lobbyists must pay an annual nonrefundable fee of one hundred 
dollars, and file the legislative or executive action they are rendering 
service to with the State Ethics Commission.193  They must also disclose 
their legal name, permanent address, phone number, and a list of all 
legislative or executive action they expect to lobby each year.194  The way 
the law is written gives religious lobbyists an advantage over their secular 
counterparts by freeing up their time and saving them one hundred dollars 
a year.195 
Further, in South Carolina, “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory 
construction is that words used therein must be given their plain and 
ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit 
or expand its operation.”196  In application to the law in question, the plain 
and ordinary meaning of a church is a Christian place of worship.197  The 
word church does not include a synagogue, mosque, or temple,198 and 
under South Carolinian precedent, it is improper to expand the plain 
meaning of the word.199  While other jurisdictions may have settled this 
 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. See id. 
192. See id. 
193. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-20(A) (2018). 
194. § 2-17-20(B). 
195. See § 2-17-20(A); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f) (2018) (“[Exempting] 
a person who represents any established church solely for the purpose of protecting the rights 
of the membership . . . or . . . the doctrines of the church or on matters considered to have an 
adverse effect upon the moral welfare of the membership of the church [from lobbyist 
registration].”). 
196. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (S.C. 1992). 
197. Church, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/church [https://perma.cc/MJQ9-8DKZ]. 
198. See id. 
199. See Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 420 S.E.2d at 846.  “In construing statutes, we seek to 
effectuate legislative intent.  The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that words used 
therein must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced 
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definitional issue,200 it has not been remedied in South Carolina.  Thus, 
not only does the lobbying code favor religious speech over non-religious 
speech, it more accurately favors Christian speech over non-Christian 
speech.  In applying the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that states cannot “pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another.”201 
The ethics code in South Carolina is facially invalid under every part 
of the above statement.202  It favors Christianity over non-Christian 
religions, and even if a court were to reject that contention, it still favors 
religious speech over non-religious speech and, for that reason, should be 
struck down.203  Even if this law has never been applied to an actual event, 
it still presents to a reasonable observer that South Carolina 
unconstitutionally favors religious speech over non-religious speech.204  It 
is also plausible that, since the South Carolina Ethics Commission—the 
only regulatory body in the state—has never heard this issue,205 religious 
lobbyists are simply falling through the cracks of enforcement.  That is, 
religious lobbyists could be acting within the law and not drawing 
attention to themselves.  Thus, the Commission would not have reason to 
evaluate the issue because it is happening outside the scope of its vision. 
Further, several states include language in their lobbying codes that 
exempts representatives of a “bona fide” religious organization.206  These 
laws create a conundrum for regulatory bodies by making it their duty to 
determine what is and is not a religious organization.207  This task is so 
 
construction to limit or expand its operation.”  Id.  This means that the lobbying statute should 
be defined with its plain and ordinary meaning.  See id. 
200. See Islamic Soc’y of Basking Ridge v. Twp. of Bernards, 226 F. Supp. 3d 320, 329–
30, 342 (D.N.J. 2016) (holding that church can be construed to refer to non-Christian religions). 
201. Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
202. Compare id. (holding that a law is invalid if it favors one religion over another), with 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f) (2018) (providing an exemption specifically for Christian 
organizations). 
203. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that laws favoring 
religion, or one religion over another, are unconstitutional). 
204. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 764–65 (1995) 
(explaining that governmental action which favors religious expression is unconstitutional); see 
also S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-17-10(13)(f) (2018). 
205. See E-mail from Steven Hamm, supra note 188. 
206. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 86300(c) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN. GEN. 
PROVIS. § 5-702(b)(1)(iii) (West 2018); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13A06(11) (2018); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi) (West 2018). 
207. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993) (holding that a very small congregation practicing the Santeria faith with a sincerely 
held belief was a religion and warranted protection). 
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complicated that it “has been a source of great controversy for courts and 
commentators.”208  The laws requiring local boards to determine what is 
and what is not religious are improper because of the complex nature of 
determining what constitutes a religion.209  The test by which courts 
determine what constitutes a religious belief is quite complicated.210  
Effectively, courts must determine that the belief in question is “sincerely 
held” and that it is in the registrants’ “own scheme of things” religious.211  
This necessarily subjective test could result in the regulatory body 
spending an inordinate amount of time determining which religious 
groups are in fact “bona fide.” 
One alternative to this subjective test would be to use the tax status 
of a religious group as the justification for their lobbying exemption.212  
However, this too presents serious concerns.  For instance, one needs to 
look no further than John Oliver and his now-closed church, Our Lady of 
Perpetual Exemption.213  John Oliver is a political satirist with a television 
program on HBO.214  His church was located in his studio, and existed to 
mock televangelism.215  This church was created—through the process of 
filing the correct paperwork with the Internal Revenue Service to establish 
a tax-exempt church—in order to “expose televangelists.”216  According 
to Oliver, the entire process was “disturbingly easy.”217  This means that 
any organization like Home Box Office, the network that produces 
Oliver’s show, could easily forgo the normal disclosure requirement by 
 
208. Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2002). 
209. See Rhett B. Larson, Holy Water and Human Rights: Indigenous Peoples’ Religious-
Rights Claims to Water Resources, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 81, 104 (2011) (noting that it 
is complicated to define religion in the context of civil rights).  This idea can be similarly applied 
to the complicated task that regulatory bodies would have in defining what is and is not religious 
in the context of lobbying. 
210. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176, 185 (1965) (explaining that 
religiously neutral language is important because rigid definitions would likely exclude some 
sincerely held religious beliefs). 
211. Id. at 185. 
212. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). 
213. Laura Bradley, Praise Be to John Oliver, Who Started a Church Just to Expose 
Televangelists, SLATE (Aug. 17, 2015, 10:57 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/
2015/08/17/john_oliver_televangelism_last_week_tonight_creates_a_church_to_hilariously.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/P2MQ-QGAP]. 
214. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, About, HBO, https://www.hbo.com/last-week-
tonight-with-john-oliver [https://perma.cc/3XHW-FXH3]. 
215.  See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Televangelists: Last Week Tonight with 
John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (Aug. 16, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7y1xJAVZxXg. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
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simply starting a legally recognizable church to gain access to a relaxed 
standard.218  This is clearly not in the best interest of the state or the people. 
This Note proposes that states should remove religious exemptions 
from their laws altogether.  This would increase transparency for voters, 
which is, after all, the purpose of lobbying codes.219  Such action would 
solve the issue of determining who can and cannot use the exemption 
based on their religiousness, and it would also help circumvent the First 
Amendment issue altogether. 
B. Neutral Provisions 
Some states have religious exemptions that do not inherently create a 
problem with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, but are 
still unnecessary.220  For example, Utah’s lobbying code provides that 
religious representatives are not lobbyists if they act “solely for the 
purpose of protecting the right to practice the religious doctrines of the 
church.”221  The law goes on to clarify that a religious actor would regain 
lobbyist status, and thus be required to register as a lobbyist and make 
disclosures, if “the individual or church makes an expenditure that confers 
a benefit on a public official.”222 
This language seemingly attempts to balance First Amendment 
concerns with lobbying regulation; however, it presents a possible 
endorsement issue under the Lemon test.223  To explain, one must consider 
lobbying that does not confer a benefit on a public official.  Lobbyists 
often take actions that are designed to benefit only their principal.224  
These strategies do not facially confer a benefit on anyone other than the 
 
218. See id. 
219. See Free Mkt. Found. v. Reisman, 573 F. Supp. 2d 952, 956 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (noting 
that reporting requirements exist to promote transparency in lobbying). 
220. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250 (2018) (exempting only communications not 
related to legislative or executive action). 
221. UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi) (West 2018). 
222. See id. 
223. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971) (holding that laws must have 
secular purposes or primary effects that neither advance nor inhibit religion and must not create 
excessive entanglement between the government and religion). 
224. See generally Tamasin Cave & Andy Rowell, The Truth About Lobbying: 10 Ways 
Big Business Controls Government, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2014, 1:45 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/mar/12/lobbying-10-ways-corprations-influence-
government [https://perma.cc/G8KL-EVEU] (explaining the difference between lobbyists and 
the government in the United Kingdom). 
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business behind the lobbying,225 and these strategies include actions such 
as presenting a position to the legislature.226  This does not necessarily 
“benefit” the members of the legislature, but it could sway their votes on 
a bill that would benefit the lobbyist principal, such as a new tax that 
would cost the principal money.  Therefore, even if Utah adds lobbying 
regulations for religious organizations that directly confer a benefit on a 
legislator or executive office, the legislature still leaves the door open for 
lobbying activity that is not directly covered by the law. 
Further, Utah does not have a provision in its lobbying code that 
regulates grassroots lobbying.227  Grassroots lobbying, or indirect 
lobbying, is an attempt to affect legislative or executive action by swaying 
public opinion, or by having the public attempt to affect legislative or 
executive action.228  This trend of lobbying has become increasingly 
popular and is encompassed by most states’ lobbying regulations.229  
Specifically, “[twenty-two states] explicitly define lobbying as direct and 
indirect communication with public officials, and [fourteen states] broadly 
define lobbying as any attempt to influence public officials.”230  This 
provides even more leeway for religious groups, as they are uniquely 
situated to directly communicate with their members on a regular basis.231  
 
225. See Theodoric Meyer & Marianne Levine, Walsh Moves to FP1, POLITICO: 
INFLUENCE (Nov. 14, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-
influence/2018/11/14/walsh-moves-to-fp1-413310 [https://perma.cc/AP2A-H9DN] (indicating 
that a lobbying coalition aims to present research to congress, presumably for the benefit of their 
principal). 
226. See id. (noting that lobbyists aim to educate Congress on a subject that will save 
Congress the time of researching this material independently, such as information regarding 
quantum research and development). 
227. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-102(14) (West 2018). 
228. See HOFRENNING, supra note 32, at 54–55. 
229. See Mayer, supra note 35, at 561; see also Edward Walker, How Grassroots 
Lobbying Consultants Are Reshaping Public Participation in Policy Battles, SCHOLARS 
STRATEGY NETWORK (May 2, 2014), https://scholars.org/brief/how-grassroots-lobbying-
consultants-are-reshaping-public-participation-policy-battles [https://perma.cc/XPQ3-Y5AA] 
(noting that grassroots lobbying has become a popular tool—not just for populist groups, but 
for Fortune 500 companies as well). 
230. JEFFREY MILYO, MOWING DOWN THE GRASSROOTS: HOW GRASSROOTS LOBBYING 
DISCLOSURE SUPPRESSES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, INST. FOR JUST. 8 (April 2010) 
(emphasis omitted), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/mowing_down_the-
grassroots.pdf [https://perma.cc/AS7S-SKKK].  These states include Alaska, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming.  Id. 
231. Compare Attendance at Religious Services, PEW RES. CTR., 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/attendance-at-religious-services/ 
[https://perma.cc/955S-9QYZ] (finding that approximately 69% of Americans attend a religious 
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They can therefore encourage their congregants to talk to their friends, 
write to their members of Congress, or engage in a whole host of other 
actions that could sway public opinion, and thus affect the lawmaking 
process without ever conferring a benefit on a public official.232 
States without grassroots lobbying provisions in their codes should 
add such a provision to increase transparency, as this method of lobbying 
has become increasingly popular.233  However, the logical application of 
the endorsement doctrine still applies to states with neutral provisions, 
with or without grassroots provisions.234  Continuing with the Utah 
example, and encompassing all laws with similar language, the lobbying 
provision in question exists to allow religious groups to defend their 
constitutionally protected status.235  That is, they can only act in a way that 
defends their free exercise of religion.236  The nature of this law, and the 
application of the endorsement test, is complicated.237  On one hand, the 
law clearly gives religious groups a means to impact the lawmaking 
process without registering as lobbyists, which their secular counterparts 
do not receive.238  On the other hand, it is unclear how this benefit could 
even possibly be applied to secular organizations.239  The right to lobby, 
unhindered, in defense of free-exercise makes sense. 
 
service either once a month and a few times a year), with Aaron Smith et al., The Current State 
of Civic Engagement in America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 1, 2009), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/09/01/the-current-state-of-civic-engagement-in-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/NY4L-SM2P] (demonstrating that only about 12% of Americans participated 
in a political rally or speech in a year’s time). 
232. See Kelly S. Shoop, If You Are a Good Christian You Have No Business Voting for 
This Candidate: Church Sponsored Political Activity in Federal Elections, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1927, 1939 (noting that religious groups act to mobilize voters and sway opinion); see also, 
Hunter Schwarz, How Much Influence Can a Church Have Over Its Members’ Political Beliefs? 
A Mormon Case Study., WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2015/02/26/how-much-influence-can-a-church-have-over-its-members-political-
beliefs-a-mormon-case-study/?utm_term=.c76afc4d7929 [https://perma.cc/TDQ5-2Y4F]. 
233. See generally Milyo, supra note 230 (noting an increase in grassroots lobbying and 
its regulation). 
234. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (noting that laws that create an 
“‘excessive government[al] entanglement with religion’” are unconstitutional even if they are 
drafted neutrally and with a secular purpose (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 
664, 674 (1970))). 
235. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi) (West 2018). 
236. See, e.g., id. 
237. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 755 (1995); see 
also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
238. See § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi). 
239. The application to non-religious counterparts is unclear because the law specifies 
defense of religious doctrine, which non-religious groups inherently do not have. 
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However, laws that give a benefit to religious groups are still not the 
most preferential outcome for these regulations.  The ability to freely 
exercise one’s religion is well defined and defended by the First 
Amendment and subsequent jurisprudence.240  The inclusion of these 
provisions in lobbying regulations only serves to further complicate the 
duties of the regulatory bodies.241 
For example, consider this hypothetical: if the Lieutenant Governor 
in Utah determined that a religious organization was spending money to 
do research about a proposed law, and it was sharing that research with 
the legislature, the Lieutenant Governor could justifiably bring an 
enforcement action.242  Through this enforcement action, the office learns 
that the religious organization in question was researching the effect of a 
proposed bill concerning religious symbols on public land.  The religious 
organization was simply concerned that the cross it has on display at the 
corner of its driveway and the public highway would be forbidden.  
Therefore, it decided to undergo considerable legal research into the 
proximity to a public road in which the state owns the land, and where 
precisely their property line was.  If it shares this research with the 
legislature is it “confer[ring] a benefit on a public official?”243  That would 
presumably be up to the Lieutenant Governor in Utah.244  These actions 
may not be considered a benefit, but surely the legislature gains something 
out of it.  If the religious organization has already done the groundwork to 
establish what the law means and how it affects roadside property, then 
the legislature is free from doing the same research.  Thus, it has received 
the benefit of time and resources.  However, the lobbying code is unclear 
as to whether this is what the legislature of Utah intended the term 
“benefit” to mean.245  The uncertainty of this law’s application is 
concerning, particularly in consideration of the First Amendment. 
The only example of a religious exemption in a lobbying code that 
does not fundamentally raise First Amendment concerns is that found in 
 
240. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 544–47 (1993) (ruling on free exercise when applied to specific rituals). 
241. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
242. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-404 (West 2018) (assigning the duty of appointing 
administrative law judges and the procedures for lobbying licenses to the Lieutenant Governor 
to enforce lobbying regulations). 
243. See § 36-11-102(14)(b)(vi). 
244. See § 36-11-404. 
245. See § 36-11-102.  The word “benefit” is not defined in the statute, thus discerning 
what the legislature intended it to mean is very difficult, and possibly a matter left completely 
up to interpretation.  See id. 
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North Carolina’s lobbying code.246  The state’s code exempts 
“communications or activities as part of a business, civic, religious, 
fraternal, personal, or commercial relationship which is not connected to 
legislative or executive action, or both.”247  This law, while probably 
unnecessary, is broad enough to likely be permissible under any 
application of First Amendment jurisprudence.248  It is wide-ranging and 
allows exemptions for religious and non-religious institutions equally, and 
neither restricts nor favors any speech.249  While the logic of this provision 
is sound, in application, it is useless.  It essentially says, lobbying does not 
include things that are not lobbying.  The protection of the North Carolina 
exemption, as well as similar exemptions in other states, is already 
conferred in the right of association.250 
Through all these “neutral provisions” there exists a series of 
unconstitutional favoritism or utter redundancies that do nothing for the 
state.251  These facially neutral lobbying provisions are not the best way 
for states to address religious lobbying, although, they are significantly 
better than the facially unconstitutional provisions.252 
Despite the efforts to provide the protections required by the First 
Amendment, these states with religious exemptions have created a 
disparity in the constitutional application of their laws.253  Only one court 
has ever observed this issue regarding lobbying, finding an Illinois 
lobbying statute invalid and issuing a restraining order.254  Upon further 
review, the White court struck down the law because its scheme of billing 
charged lobbyists more money than was required to sufficiently manage 
the regulation process.255  The court suggested that the legislature would 
amend the law, and thus, they would not need to rule on, via the 
 
246. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-250(a)(17) (2018). 
247. Id. 
248. See supra Section I.C. 
249. See § 163A-250(a)(17); see also supra Section I.C. 
250. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622–23 (1984). 
251. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
252. See supra Section II.A. 
253. See sources cited supra note 10. 
254. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. White, No. 09 C 7706, 2009 WL 5166231, at *4–
5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter White I]; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. White, 
692 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2010) [hereinafter White II] (ruling that the lobbying law in 
Illinois violated the First Amendment by charging lobbyists more than was required to operate 
the registration process).  Under this ruling, the court declined to address whether the religious 
exemption was a violation of the First Amendment because the law was already found to be 
unconstitutional for less pervasive reasons.  Id. 
255. See White I, 2009 WL 5166231, at *4. 
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endorsement test, whether religious exemptions were a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.256  To date, the law still has a religious 
exemption.257  Thus, no court has ever ruled on the constitutionality of a 
religious exemption to a lobbying code.  However, under the endorsement 
test, any of the laws containing religious exemptions would not likely be 
upheld.258 
C. Laws with No Mention of Religion 
Forty-one states have lobbying codes with no mention of religious 
activity.259  While those states may have some problems in their lobbying 
codes,260 these issues are outside the scope of this Note.  States included 
in Subparts A and B of Part II should consider modeling their lobbying 
regulations after the states included in this Section to avoid any First 
Amendment violations.  Specifically, states looking to provide 
exemptions for certain groups should look to Connecticut for guidance on 
how to encompass group communication and transportation in their 
laws.261  Although Connecticut arrived at this solution the wrong way,262 
it is the best statutory solution to the issues this Note addresses. 
III. REMEDYING THE LOBBYING DISPARITY 
The solution that could best solve the issue of regulation for religious 
lobbyists would be to treat all lobbyists equally under the law.  The 
application of this idea, however, may present complications.  There are 
serious issues to consider regarding a facially neutral law in its application 
to religious lobbyists.263  These issues include not only constitutional 
 
256. Cf. White II, 692 F. Supp. at 993.  The court does not go into detail on how they 
would evaluate the claim of an establishment clause violation, but they do decline to rule on the 
issue in favor of “judicial economy.”  See id. 
257. See 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170/3 (A)(7) (2018). 
258. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1971) (ruling that laws creating “an 
excessive government entanglement with religion” should be found unconstitutional (quoting 
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))); see also supra Section I.C. 
259. See sources cited 2supra note 31. 
260. See supra Section II.B (discussing neutral grassroots lobbying provisions); see also 
Mayer, supra note 35, at 561. 
261. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-91(6) (2018) (exempting some expenditures for all 
organizations rather than exempting religious activity). 
262. See supra Section I.D (arguing that the catalyst for this legislative change in 
Connecticut was, at best, a clever political strategy by a senate hopeful). 
263. See supra Sections II.A–B; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–42 
(holding that discriminatory intent must be demonstrated in order for a law to be deemed facially 
neutral). 
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concerns, such as whether the suggested regulation will chill religious 
speech,264 but also the deeply complex challenge of motivating lawmakers 
to change an unknown, but likely strongly supported, law.265 
First, in addressing the complexity of reworking several states’ 
lobbying rules, it is important to emphasize that this is not a call for a 
federal standard on lobbying that applies across all fifty states.  The federal 
government can treat lobbying however it desires.  States have inherent 
knowledge of what their needs are as well as what works best in their state.  
That said, some uniformity in this regard would be preferential.266  While 
there are unique differences across the country’s many lobbying 
regulations, most of them make no mention of religious activity at all.267  
This is the ideal way to deal with religious lobbyists; regulating them 
identically to their secular counterparts.268 
Critics of this idea argue that lobbying registration and disclosure 
create an undue burden on religious bodies, thus chilling their free 
speech.269  However, that is not the case.  Under the chilling effect 
doctrine, there must be an actual chilling before courts will apply the strict 
scrutiny standard to evaluate whether the chilling is permissible.270  A 
chilling exists when the law interferes with, or prevents, engagement in 
protected expression.271  Lobbying is inherently political speech, which is 
protected by the First Amendment.272  The Court has upheld lobbying 
regulations as permissible.273  Therefore, claiming that regulation on 
religious lobbyists creates a chilling of protected speech, but that lobbying 
 
264. See supra Section II.C.1. 
265. See supra Section I.B. 
266. See Overview, supra note 7 (explaining that each state has a unique lobbying law 
with key differences). 
267. See generally States Define Lobbying, supra note 6. 
268. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that regulating 
religious and non-religious lobbyists equally would avoid a constitutional challenge under the 
“Lemon Test” or other parts of First Amendment jurisprudence); see also supra Section I.C. 
269. Complaint, supra note 141, ¶ 9 (arguing that a registration and reporting requirement 
in the lobbying code, when applied to the church, chilled protected speech). 
270. See supra Section I.C. 
271. See Eric Lardiere, The Justiciability and Constitutionality of Political Intelligence 
Gathering, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 976, 984–87 (1983) (noting that courts have applied the chilling 
effect doctrine to government surveillance as well as prohibitive state action when it interferes 
with or prohibits political engagement). 
272. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419–20 (1989). 
273. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (holding that 
lobbying regulations do not violate the First Amendment). 
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regulations in general do not, is problematic because this favoritism 
creates an endorsement of religious speech.274 
Admittedly, religious organizations would likely have the most 
complex issues in determining what their ordinary course of business is 
and what constitutes an effort to influence legislative or executive 
action.275  That is, religious organizations spend a considerable amount of 
time discussing social problems.276  There is certainly some overlap with 
topics of a political connotation and, thus, under the law, some difficult 
questions concerning what does and does not constitute lobbying.277  The 
church’s argument accurately points out that the effort it would take to 
determine if every message to congregants was in fact lobbying would be 
crippling.  Therefore, states should adapt their lobbying codes to exempt 
communication with the groups’ own members, like the Connecticut Code 
of Ethics for Lobbyists.278  Connecticut’s Code of Ethics exempts “any 
expenditure made by any club, committee, partnership, organization, 
business, union, association or corporation for the purpose of publishing 
a newsletter or other release intended primarily for its members, 
shareholders or employees, whether in written or electronic form or made 
orally during a regularly noticed meeting.”279 
If states were to adopt this type of language in their lobbying codes, 
while removing the explicit religious exemptions, they could equalize the 
playing field with regard to lobbying without creating an undue burden on 
religious groups.280  Even though a ruling based on the chilling effect 
 
274. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995). 
275. See Complaint, supra note 141, ¶¶ 8–9 (stating that there are actions that were both 
part of the church’s moral duty and required to be reported by the State Code of Ethics). 
276. Id. ¶ 10. 
[F]rom time to time, the Diocese’s religious mission compels it, the Bishop of the 
Diocese, and pastors within the Diocese to take stands on legislation that concerns 
the moral issues of the day and to urge parishioners to act on the basis of Church 
teachings.  The Diocese communicates these messages to its parishioners through 
its website, in newsletters, at religious services, and through a variety of other 
means. 
Id. 
277. See id. ¶¶ 8–9 (noting that the Church is compelled to take moral action, which may 
also have a political connotation). 
278. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-91(6) (2018) (exempting certain activities from being 
considered an expenditure under the lobbying code, rather than exempting certain groups). 
279. Id. 
280. See id.  The statute allows exemptions for any group communicating with its 
members and for the transportation of its members.  This allows religious groups—as well as 
non-religious groups—protection from infringement on their daily communications with 
members. 
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doctrine should determine that standard, lobbying disclosure requirements 
would not chill the political speech of religious groups.281  This type of 
amendment would help prevent the issue even more.  Doing so would 
provide religious groups—as well as non-religious groups—the ability to 
send messages to their members without it being considered a reportable 
expenditure under the lobbying code.282  This is favorable to these groups 
as well as the state because it would lighten the necessity for oversight in 
certain aspects of weekly meetings or members-only communication.  
Such an application of the law ideally mitigates the chilling concerns, 
while maintaining a strong enough regulatory presence to provide the 
necessary amount of transparency to voters. 
Critics would also cite the overbreadth doctrine as a claim against an 
ethics body’s ability to apply regulations to religious organizations.283  
This argument is erroneous, however, because under the “First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it 
prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.  The doctrine seeks to 
strike a balance between competing social costs.”284  In weighing the 
social costs of freedom of expression compared with government 
transparency, the state should weigh the actual cost of each.285  To 
illustrate, each state should evaluate the amount of protected speech their 
lobbying disclosure requirement would prohibit.  Each state should arrive 
at the same conclusion: lobbying disclosures do not prohibit speech.286  
Using Connecticut as an example, lobbying registration and disclosure are 
not based on the content of the speech, but rather the intent of the action.287 
The overbreadth doctrine is not disturbed by looking to the intent of 
the speaker and requiring a minimal fee and a comprehensive disclosure 
standard.288  Application of the overbreadth doctrine is only triggered 
when a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited.289  Thus, this 
 
281. See supra Section I.C.1. 
282. See § 1-91(6). 
283. E.g., Opinion Letter, supra note 140. 
284. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (emphasis added). 
285. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
521 (1993) (“It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly 
tailored to advance that interest.”). 
286. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1983) (holding 
that lobbying disclosure requirements do not violate the First Amendment). 
287. See Conn. St. Ethics Comm’n, supra note 133. 
288. Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (explaining that a law is unconstitutional under the 
overbreadth doctrine when it “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech”). 
289. See id. 
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argument regarding the overbreadth doctrine by critics fails the test of 
legal application. 
Ideally, in a world where lobbyists are spending millions of dollars 
annually,290 states would have identical laws that regulate lobbying, which 
would avoid creating unnecessary confusion and overburdening protected 
speech.291  However, because of the complexities of the American system 
of federalism and the individualized needs of each state, no two lobbying 
laws are identical.292  While this creates ambiguity across the board for 
lobbyists seeking to lobby in more than one state, it is likely not going to 
be fixed by any simple solution.  Lobbying codes must allow protected 
speech and they must balance this idea with transparency.293 
It therefore follows that the ideal solution is for states to adjust their 
lobbying codes to include language that allows for the regulation of 
religious lobbyists, while maintaining their own specialized needs and 
refraining from overburdening protected speech.294  Facially neutral laws 
that treat religious and non-religious lobbyists equally are the ideal way to 
remedy this problem.295  Accordingly, states should amend their lobbying 
 
290. See Top Spenders, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
top.php?showYear=2017&indexType=s [https://perma.cc/RS3F-L2JZ]. 
291. See Craig Holman & William Luneburg, Lobbying and Transparency: A 
Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Reform, 1 INT. GROUPS & ADVOC. 75, 75–76 (2012). 
292. See Lobbyist Registration Requirements, NCSL (Oct. 30, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-lobbyist-registration-requirements.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/A9HZ-34EG]. 
293. See Charles Krauthammer, In Defense of Lobbying, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/28/AR2008022803232.html 
[https://perma.cc/T4KR-EXLZ] (arguing that the First Amendment protects the right to lobby). 
294. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-91(6) (2018). 
“Expenditure” does not include (A) the payment of a registrant’s fee pursuant to 
section 1-95, (B) any expenditure made by any club, committee, partnership, 
organization, business, union, association or corporation for the purpose of 
publishing a newsletter or other release intended primarily for its members, 
shareholders or employees, whether in written or electronic form or made orally 
during a regularly noticed meeting, (C) any expenditure made by any club, 
committee, partnership, organization, business, union, association or corporation 
for the purpose of transporting its members, shareholders or employees to or from 
a specific site, where such members, shareholders or employees received no other 
compensation or reimbursement for lobbying from such club, committee, 
partnership, organization, business, union, association or corporation, or (D) 
contributions, membership dues or other fees paid to associations, nonstock 
corporations or tax-exempt organizations under Section 501(c) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of 
the United States, as from time to time amended. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
295. See supra Part II. 
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codes to remove any language specifically exempting religious 
organizations from filing on any grounds and instead adopt a more neutral 
policy such as the exemption in Connecticut.296  This type of exemption 
necessarily allows for protected religious expression while still providing 
adequate transparency for voters. 
CONCLUSION 
Just as the Paleolithic painters transcribed “The Sorcerer,” religious 
lobbyists are channeling their perception of the divine.  They are acting 
on their beliefs, and as such, their view of God’s desires.297  This 
inherently personal part of their lives is extremely important and should 
be valued by society.  Our protection of free speech and religious activity 
is crucial.298 
However, this does not inherently forgo the need for transparency in 
government.  Although many states have acted to create broad lobbying 
exemptions for religious activity in defense of the First Amendment, what 
these states have done is create an intrinsic violation therein.299  This 
violation can be remedied without a complete overhaul of the lobbying 
process.  States should regulate lobbyists on an equal playing field.300 
This equality will allow voters to have accurate information regarding 
who is influencing their government, and it will give religious groups 
enough leeway to openly practice their faiths with their own members in 
any way they deem fit, without running afoul the lobbying rules.  Such 
equality will also serve as a benefit to lawmakers applying philosophies 
of political survival as a tool to gauge their constituents’ desires.  
Ultimately, a reform of lobbying regulations will allow everyone to get a 
piece of the political pie, but also to see how much pie their neighbor has 
taken for themselves. 
 
296. See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
297. See ASLAN, supra note 59, at xii; see also supra Section I.A (exploring the evolution 
of human thought on God). 
298. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
299. See supra Sections II.A–B. 
300. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-91(6) (2018) (exempting intra-organization 
communication from qualifying as a lobbying expenditure, regardless of the group). 
